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Abstract 
In this paper, we investigate whether capital structure differs between for-profit and 
nonprofit sectors by focusing on two key aspects of the latter: the non-distribution 
constraint and the stakeholder oriented governance system. We develop a theoretical 
model and show that the former negatively affects leverage, defined as the amount 
borrowed over the total investment, whilst the latter has a positive effect. We then 
analyze a longitudinal data set of balance sheets of 800 firms operating in the social 
residential sector in Italy and show that, once controlled for observable 
characteristics, for-profit companies have a leverage 18% higher than nonprofit 
enterprises, even if the latter face lower credit costs. We explain this finding by 
arguing that the effect of the non-distribution constraint prevails over the effect of 
stakeholder orientation. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper studies how firms’ capital structure differs between for-profit and nonprofit 
sectors. We focus on two aspects that differentiate the latter from the former: (i) the 
non-distribution-of-profit constraint and (ii) the stakeholder oriented governance 
system. (i) The non-distribution constraint prevents a nonprofit organization from 
distributing its net earnings to individuals who exercise control over it, such as 
members, officers, directors, or trustees. (ii) The objectives of management in a 
nonprofit company incorporate the welfare of stakeholders other than investors, 
encompassing employees, customers, suppliers, or the community. 
 
Economists have paid great attention to the topic of firms pursuing something more 
than the mere maximization of profits: three strands of literature are worth 
mentioning. First, the literature on mixed oligopoly mainly focuses on competition 
between state-owned welfare-maximizing public firms and profit-maximizing private 
firms: see De Fraja and Del Bono (1990) and Nett (1993) for general surveys. More 
recently, studies on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) have become mainstream. 
CSR is a form of corporate self-regulation, according to which firms commit to a 
behavior that takes into account not only the shareholder interests (profit), but also 
the utility of agents dealing with the firm (stakeholders). See Kitzmueller and 
Shimshack (2012) for a recent survey. Finally and quite naturally, the literature on 
social enterprises: see, e.g. Bonatti et al. (2005) and Borzaga et al. (2010). 
 
To the best of our knowledge the analysis of capital structure differences between for-
profit and nonprofit sectors has instead been given little consideration in the economic 
literature. In a previous paper (Fedele and Miniaci, 2010), we develop a framework to 
investigate whether enterprise capital structure differs between for-profit and 
nonprofit sectors. We show that the non-distribution constraint reduces leverage, 
defined as the amount borrowed over the total investment, whilst the intrinsically high 
commitment of nonprofit entrepreneurs augments leverage. We then study a 
longitudinal data set of balance sheets of 504 for-profit and nonprofit firms operating 
in the social residential sector in Italy. We show that once controlled for observable 
characteristics, for-profit companies have a leverage 6% higher than non-profit 
enterprises, even if the latter face lower credit costs. We explain this finding by 
arguing that the effect of the non-distribution constraint prevails over the effect of the 
social entrepreneurs’ intrinsic motivation. 
 
In this paper we put our focus on the stakeholder oriented governance systems rather 
than intrinsic motivation. We elaborate a theoretical framework where firms’ objective 
function is modelled as a linear combination between two different goals: a traditional 
one represented by profits and a less traditional one represented by stakeholder 
welfare. With no loss of generality, we focus on a special category of stakeholders: 
consumers. This approach is borrowed from the aforementioned literature, which 
adopts a somewhat common way to model the objective function of publicly owned 
firms, CSR firms and social enterprises: all these organizations are assumed to care 
both about profits and the stakeholders’ benefit, where the latter is sometimes 
identified with consumer welfare (see e.g. Brekke et al., 2011). We consider firms 
which need external investments to finance a productive activity and we then compute 
the firms’ optimal leverage, defined as the amount borrowed over the total 
investment. Our theoretical aim is to investigate how such a ratio is affected both by 
the firm’s consumer orientation and the non-distribution constraint. Finally, we 
provide an empirical analysis relying on a longitudinal data set of balance sheets of 
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800 share companies and social cooperatives operating in the social residential sector 
in Italy. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we develop the 
theoretical framework. In Section 3 we provide a description of the sample used in the 
exercise and an assessment of its coverage and quality. In Section 4 we use panel 
data econometric techniques to identify the causal relation between financing 
strategies and type of enterprise. 
 
 
2. Theoretical setup 
Consider an economy with many homogeneous consumers, each one endowed with 
income I, and a firm. A representative consumer’s preferences are given by a quasi-
linear utility function U(q)+m, U′(q)>0>U′′(q), where q is the quantity of a 
good/service produced by the firm, p denotes its price and m is a numéraire good 
whose price is normalized to one. The firm profit function is Π((q)p), where q(p) is the 
demand function for the good/service. The firm is characterized by the following utility 
function: 
 
( , ( )) [ ( ) ] (1- ) ( ( ))V a q p a U q m a q p= + + Π  (1) 
 
where α∈[0,1] measures how much the firm weights the consumer utility relatively to 
its profit. The higher α, the more consumer-oriented the firm is. 
Before proceeding we specify the timing of the model, which we solve backwards: 
- at t=0, the firm selects p and k (k will be defined below) to maximize V(α,q(p)) 
given demand function q(p). 
- at t=1, the consumers select q and m to maximize U(q)+m given price p and 
income I. 
 
 
2.1. Consumer problem 
At t=1 a representative consumer chooses q and m to maximize her/his utility subject 
to the budget constraint, i.e. she/he solves the following problem: 
,
max ( ) ,
s.t. .
q m U q m
pq m I
+
+ ≤
 
The Lagrangean is ( ) - ( )U q m pq mλ+ + . FOCs are 
( ) - 0,
=1- =0.
U q p
q
m
λ
λ
∂
′= =
∂
∂
∂
 
 
The second equality requires λ=1, which means that the constraint holds binding: 
                                                      m I pq= −                         (2) 
 
Plugging λ=1 into the first equality yields: 
                                                   ( ) 0U q p′ − =                        (3) 
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We denote with q(p) the demand function, i.e. the value of q satisfying the above 
equality, while optimal m is given by (2). Applying the implicit function theorem to (3) 
yields q′(p)=(1/(U′′(q))), which is negative by assumption: the demand is decreasing 
in price p. Substituting q(p) and (2) in U(q)+m yields the consumer indirect utility 
function 
 
                                        ( ) ( )( ) ( ),p I U q p I pq pφ = + −              (4) 
 
Invoking the envelope theorem it is easy to check that ∂φ(p,I)/∂p=-q(p)<0: the 
consumer indirect utility is negatively affected by price p. Notice also that ∂²φ 
(p,I))/∂p²=-q′(p)>0: φ(p,I) is convex in p. 
 
 
2.2. Firm problem 
Next, we designate with C(p) the production cost of the quantity level q(p) of the 
good/service: C(p) can be alternatively interpreted as the firm’s investment size. Such 
an amount is financed through firm’s cash holdings, denoted by M, and/or a loan from 
a lender. We let k∈[0,1] denote the self-finance ratio, kC(p) being thereby the self-
financed amount of investment. The following constraint must therefore hold: 
kC(p)≤M. We also set equal to 1 the opportunity unitary cost of financial capital for 
the firm and we denote with r>0 the mark up charged by the lender: self-finance is 
cheaper than borrowing due, for example, to some degree of lender market power. 
Finally, the firm profit function writes as 
                                 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), 1 1 .p k pq p k k r C pΠ = − + − +       (5) 
 
To simplify computations, we rely on explicit functional forms for consumers utility 
and firm’s costs. We let 
                                                ( ) 21
2
aU q q q
b b
= −                       (6) 
and 
                                                      ( )C q cq=                            (7) 
with a,b,c>0. Substituting (6) into (3) and solving by q yields the demand function: 
                                         ( ) /
0 /
a bp if p a b
q p
if p a b
− ≤
= 
>
                 (8) 
 
Focusing on p∈[0,a/b] and substituting (6) and (8) into (4) yields the consumer 
indirect utility function: 
                                             ( ) ( )
2
,
2
a bp
p I I
b
φ −= +                     (9) 
 
Note that ∂φ(p,I)/∂p=-(a-bp)≤0 and ∂²φ (p,I)/∂p² =b: the function is decreasing and 
convex in p∈[0,a/b], hence maximum for p=0. 
 
Plugging (8) and (7) into (5) gives the firm profit function: 
 
                                 ( ) ( ) ( ){ }( ), 1 1 .p k p k k r c a bpΠ = − + − + −      (10) 
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Notice that ( , ) / (1- ) - 2p k p a bc bcr k bp∂Π ∂ = + +  and ² ( , ) / ² -2p k p b∂ Π ∂ = : the function is 
concave in p, maximum for ( (1- )) / 2p a bc bcr k b= + +  and nonnegative for 
[ ( (1- )(1 )), / ]p c k k r a b∈ + + . 
 
Assumption ( ) ( )( )1- 1 /p c k k r a b≡ + + <  for any k∈[0,1]. 
 
The above assumption requires marginal cost c(k+(1-k)(1+r)) to be lower than 
maximum price a/b, i.e. price level above which the demand becomes nought 
according to (8). This is necessary since Π(q(p)) would otherwise be negative for any 
p≤a/b. The assumption also implies 
 
(1- ) /
2
a bc bcr kp a b
b
+ +
< <  
for any k∈[0,1]. 
 
The firm chooses p and k to maximize (1) subject to its financial and participation 
constraints: kC(p)≤M and Π(p)≥0, respectively. The latter requires p∈[p,a/b], which 
we take into account when solving the unconstrained maximization problem. The role 
played by the former constraint is verified ex-post. The firm’s problem is then: 
     ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }( )
2
,
max , , 1 1 1
2p k
a bp
V p k I p k k r c a bp
b
α α α
 
−
= + + − − + − + −    
  
   (11) 
where the above expression is (1) after taking into account (4) and after substituting 
(9) and (10). First notice that 
 
( ) ( ) ( ), , / 1 0V p k k c a bp rα α∂ ∂ = − − >  
 
for any , /p p a b ∈    and α<1, hence the firm sets k as high as possible, taking into 
account its financial constraint ( )kC p M≤ . It follows that ( ){ }min 1, /k M C p= . 
 
Focus now on p. Objective function (11) is a linear combination between (9), which is 
a convex function decreasing in p, and (10), that is a concave function with a 
maximum belonging to the interval under consideration. As a consequence, we expect 
to find an internal solution for p only if the weight on (10) is sufficiently high, i.e. if α 
is low enough. 
 
The firm’s optimal price choice derives from the analysis of the F.O.C. with respect to 
p: 
                      
( ) ( )( ) ( ), , 2 1 1 2 3V p k a bc a bc bcr k bp
p
α
α α α α
∂
= + − − + − − − −
∂
    (12) 
 
It is easy to show (see Appendix A.1 for computations) that optimal price depends on 
the firm’s consumer orientation α. In symbols, 
                                               
* 10,
2
1
,1
2
p if
p
p if
α
α
  
∈    
= 
  ∈    
             (13) 
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where 
( )( ) ( )( )( )
( )
*
1 1- - 2 1 1- 10,
2 3 2
a bc r k a bc r k
p p for
b
α
α
α
+ + + +  
≡ > ∈ 
−  
 
 
If α≥1/2, then the firm weights more the consumer indirect utility function than its 
own profits; since such a function is negatively affected by price p, the firm sets p 
equal to p, which is the lowest level compatible with the nonnegativity of profits 
constraint, Π(p)≥0. 
 
By contrast, if α is lower, then the firm puts more weight on profits and it increases 
the price to p*. In this case it is easy to check that p* decreases with α: 
                                          
( )( )
( )
*
2
1 1
0.
2 3
a bc r kp
bα α
− + −∂
= − <
∂
−
             (14) 
 
Lemma 1 - A more consumer-oriented a firm selects a lower optimal price. 
 
The result of Lemma 1 is fairly intuitive: if a firm cares a lot about the consumer well 
being, represented by φ(p,I) in (9), then it reduces the price. 
 
Substituting (13) into C(p)=c(a-bp) gives the optimal investment size as a function of 
k: 
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( ){ }
*
*
1 1 2 1 1 10,
2 3 2
,
11 1 ,1
2
a bc r k a bc r k
c a bp c a if
C p k
c a bp c a b c r k if
α
α
α
α
   + + − − + + −      
− = − ∈   
−    = 
   
− = − + − ∈     
 (15) 
 
Recalling that the optimal amount of self-finance is ( ){ }min 1/ /M C p , we substitute 
(15) into ( )/k M C p=  and get 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )( )( ) ( )( )
2
*
2 2
2
1 4 2 3 1 1 1 10,
2 1 2 2
1 4 1 1
,1
22
rbM a bc r a bc r
if
bcr bcrk
c a bc r bc rM c a bc r
if
bc r
α α α
α
α
α
  
− − + − + − − +   
− ∈ 
−  
= 

− + + − − +  
∈    
     (16) 
 
Before stating the main results of this section, we define the firm’s leverage L as the 
amount borrowed over the total investment. In symbols, 
( ) ( )
( )
1
1
k C p
L k
C p
−
≡ = −  
 
After plugging k* into the above expression, one can check that (see Appendix A.2 for 
details) 
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* * *
10 0,
2
0.
10 ,1
2
if
L k L
and
M
if
α
α α
α
  
> ∈  ∂ ∂ ∂  
= − <∂ ∂ ∂ 
= ∈    
 
 
A more consumer-oriented firm charges a lower price according to (14); this increases 
demand and the deriving costs, thus forcing the firm to augment the leverage for any 
given M. At the same time, the leverage is decreasing in cash holdings M for any 
given α, since self financing is cheaper than external financing. The overall effect of α 
and M on L* is summed up as follows: 
 
                
[ ] ( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
[ ] ( )
*
*
*
1 0 for any 0,1 / 2
1 0 if 
,
0 if 2
0 for any 0,1
o
o
k if M c a bc
c a bck M
L if M c a bc
M
if M c a bc
α
α α
α α
α
 − > ∈ < −

 − − > > 
= ∈ −   ≤  
 ∈ > −
            (17) 
 
where ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]2 / 3 0,1/ 2o M M c a bc M c a bcα ≡ − − − − ∈       . If the firm is cash-poor (or 
cash-rich), i.e. ( ) / 2M c a bc< −  (or ( )M c a bc> − ), then it has (or has not) to resorts 
to the credit market for any α. The most interesting case is for 
( ) ( )/ 2,M c a bc c a bc∈ − −   : within this interval, the firms decides to borrow only when 
it is relatively oriented towards its consumers. 
 
Since we are interested in studying the effect of α and M on L, we sum up our findings 
by focusing on a cash-constrained firm, i.e. a firm with ( )M c a bc≤ − . 
 
Proposition 1 - Optimal leverage L* of a cash-constrained firm increases with α and 
decreases with M. 
 
The lower optimal price selected by a more consumer-oriented firm increases the 
demand and, in turn, the production costs: this forces a cash-constrained firm to 
increase borrowing. By contrast, the effect of M on leverage is driven by the 
assumption that self financing is cheaper than external financing. 
 
 
3. The data 
The theoretical model developed in the previous Section provides predictions about 
the relationship between the indebtedness level of the firm, L*, and (i) the firm’s 
consumer orientation, α, (ii) the level of own funds, M. 
 
Any analysis aiming at testing the empirical validity of such a theory should therefore 
rely on a dataset providing a reasonable measure of these variables for a 
representative sample of companies. We exploit here information available in the 
AIDA database. AIDA is the Italian component of the European Amadeus database, 
distributed by Bureau van Dijk, which is used in most of the empirical analysis on the 
capital structure of European firms. The AIDA version we have access to provides 
accounts, ratios and activities for the largest 680,000 Italian companies from 1998 to 
2009. We focus on firms whose activities are described by the ATECO codes 
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corresponding to the residential social services, i.e. firms operating nursing homes for 
the elderly, disabled, patients with psychiatric disorders or drug addicts. We are able 
to find 800 companies with 2009 balance sheet data satisfying the previous criteria. 
Among them, 411 are share companies and the remaining 389 are social 
cooperatives4: we consider the former as our sample of for-profit companies (and 
below we refer to them as Limited companies) and the latter as nonprofit (SCs below). 
 
Companies are remarkably heterogeneous with respect to their size, both between 
and within the two types of firms we consider. In Figure 1 we depict the empirical 
distribution function of total assets and total revenues by company type. The median 
limited liability company has 0.89 million Euro of total assets in 2009, the double of 
the median social cooperative. As the graph shows, only 25% of not-for-profit 
companies have more than 1.1 million Euro of total assets. The right graph of Figure 1 
shows that SCs are smaller than limited companies also in terms of total revenue 
(with a median of 0.58 vs. 1.03 million Euro). 
 
Companies look somewhat more homogeneous if we consider few fundamental 
indexes which play a crucial role in our empirical analysis. First, we consider C(p*,k*) 
to be the stock of assets (either tangibles or not) used by the company to supply its 
services. We then introduce the leverage, defined as the ratio between total debt and 
total assets. We consider such a variable as a proxy of the theoretical L*. The Return 
on Assets (ROA) index is defined as the ratio between profits gross of taxes and total 
assets, a proxy of the expected return of one unit of investment. Finally, the Tangible 
Assets/Total Assets ratio is, given the dimension of the company, a proxy of the 
amount of collateral the company can provide to the lender and potentially positively 
correlated with the leverage. 
 
Figure 1 - Distribution of total assets and total revenues by company type - Year 2009 
 
 
Table 1 shows that on average the limited companies have the highest leverage 
together with the highest tangible to total assets ratio and the highest ROA. It is 
worth remarking that, although we consider firms operating in the same sector, their 
                                                 
4 We dropped from the sample about 10 cooperatives without nonprofit status. 
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activities may differ substantially. Such dissimilarities are not directly observable but 
might be reflected by the incidence of the labour cost on the revenues. We thus 
consider the Labour costs/Total Revenues ratio as a useful index to describe these 
structural differences: in Table 2 below we show that this ratio is remarkably higher 
for the SCs than for the for-profit companies. These statistics suggest that the firms in 
our sample supply heterogeneous services, with SCs specializing in labour intensive 
ones. 
 
Table 1 - Ratios by company type, averages over the 2000-2009 period. Percentage points 
 Social cooperatives Limited companies 
Leverage 58.04 70.87 
ROA 3.74 4.63 
Tangible/Total Assets 19.83 34.82 
Labour cost/Total revenue 55.72 35.94 
Standard error ROA 6.79 6.05 
Financial burden/Total Debt 1.97 2.91 
Years operating 11.43 11.84 
Number of observations 2207 2365 
 
The decision to resort to the credit market is related to the risk aversion of the 
entrepreneurs which, again, is not directly observable. A risk-averse agent is ready to 
accept a lower expected return on investment in order to reduce its volatility. We can 
therefore compare the mean and the standard error of ROA for the two types of 
companies to gain some insight into their risk attitude. Table 1 shows that the mean 
of ROA is lower for the SCs, while the mean of the ROA standard error over the period 
considered is lower for the SCs, which suggests that not-for-profit firms are more risk 
tolerant than for-profit companies. 
 
Finally, if we consider the financial burden/total debt as a proxy of the credit cost, we 
see that SCs have on average a financial burden lighter than that of the limited 
liability companies; we conclude that credit is likely to be less costly for social 
enterprises. 
 
 
4. Regression analysis 
 
In this section we run a multiple regression analysis by estimating a random effects 
model for longitudinal data (Wooldridge, 2001). This will give further insights into the 
effects of the variables considered in the theoretical model over the actual choices of 
the leverage operated by the companies. We have balance sheet information going 
from 2000 to 2009 and we follow a reduced form equation approach by estimating the 
following linear dynamic model 
 
                         1 1 2 2 1ln ln lnit i it it it t i itL z L L x T uα δ δ β γ ε− − −′ ′ ′= + + + + + +                (18) 
 
where: lnL is logarithm of the leverage; zi is a set of time invariant company 
characteristics including a dummy variable which equals 1 for the limited companies; 
xit includes total assets (in logs), the ratio of tangible to total assets, the incidence of 
the labour costs on total revenue, and the ROA index; Tt identifies a full set of time 
dummies in order to take into account business cycle effects; εi is the unobservable 
time invariant individual effect; finally, uit is the idiosyncratic error term. Given 
dynamic nature of the model under consideration, neither the ordinary least squares 
(OLS) nor the generalized least squares (GLS) provide consistent estimates of the 
parameters of interest. Indeed, past values of the balance sheet items are correlated 
with the unobservable time invariant characteristics of the firms, εi, and they are 
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potentially correlated with past idiosyncratic shocks, uit. We thus resort to GMM 
estimates following Blundell and Bond (2000). We use time variant covariates lagged 
at least twice as our instrument for the first differenced equation; we instead rely on 
time, regional, industry and start up dummies for the level equation. The Sargan test 
for the overidentifying restrictions and the Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation 
in first-differenced errors never reject the hypothesis of correct specification. 
 
Variation in the level of debts, and more in general the capital structure of the 
company, is affected by some degree of inertia: our estimates (see Table 2) show that 
indeed the current leverage is positively correlated to its past values. Such correlation 
does not explain all the dynamics, the leverage decreases when the total assets 
increase and when the companies become more profitable. Although the parameter is 
precisely estimated, the economic relevance of this relation is limited: one percentage 
point more of ROA is associated with a decrease of 0.3% of the leverage, which at the 
average leverage level of 64.7% corresponds to 0.02 percentage points. The elasticity 
of leverage to total assets (∂lnLeveraget /∂lnTotalAssetst) is estimated to be -0.05. 
The estimated parameter for the tangible to total assets ratio is 0.40, which suggests 
the access to the credit market is significantly affected by the nature (tangible vs. 
intangible) of the firms’ assets, and that the total amount of assets is not a sufficient 
descriptor of the company ability to put up a collateral. Unsurprisingly, the past values 
of the leverage ratio plays a crucial role: one percent increase in the last year 
leverage determines a 0.32% increase in the leverage of the following year, which 
corresponds on average to an increase of 0.2 percentage points. The incidence of 
labour costs on total revenue does not seem to significantly affect the indebtedness of 
the company. Finally, although we controlled for many observable characteristics of 
the companies, the for-profit companies proved to have a leverage 18% higher than 
SCs. This difference is reduced only when we compare start up coops with limited 
companies operating for more than 5 years. 
 
Table 2 - GMM estimates of equation (18). Dependent variable: leverage. 
The specification includes also year, regional and industry dummies. 
Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity 
 Coefficient Standard error Z P>|z| 
Limited companies .180 .049 3.67 .000 
Less than 5 yrs .147 .035 4.19 .000 
Ltd Co.× Less than 5 yrs -.021 .030 -.71 .480 
lnLeveraget-1 .320 .054 5.90 .000 
lnLeveraget-2 .055 .030 1.84 .066 
lnTotalAssetst-1 -.049 .021 -2.33 .020 
Tangible/Total Assetst-1 .403 .129 3.11 .002 
ROAt-1 -.003 .001 -2.42 .016 
Labour cost/Total revenuet-1 .148 .174 .85 .394 
 
Why do the limited companies have a capital structure different from SCs even after 
controlling for all the above factors? According to our theoretical framework, SCs, 
being more oriented towards consumer welfare, reduce the price. This increases their 
demand and, in turn, their production costs: a cash-constrained firm is therefore 
forced to increase borrowing. At the same time the presence of a non-distribution 
constraint, peculiar of nonprofit organizations, increases the fraction of own capital on 
total investment: this negatively affects leverage of SCs according to Proposition 1. 
 
Our main empirical finding is that leverage of for-profit companies is 18% higher than 
that of SCs. After remarking that credit is likely to be less costly for social enterprises 
as indicated in Table 1, the empirical result is interpreted by conjecturing that 
negative effect of the non-distribution constraint on leverage outdoes positive one due 
to consumer orientation. 
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Appendix 
 
A.1 Optimal price (13) 
Focus on (12): notice that 
a+bc-(2a+bc)α+bcr(1-k)(1-α)≥0⇔α≤((a+bc(1+r(1-k)))/(2a+bc(1+r(1-k)))) 
and 
-bp(2-3α)≥0⇔α>(2/3) 
where ((a+bc(1+r(1-k)))/(2a+bc(1+r(1-k))))<(2/3) under Assumption 1. 
 
It follows that for α∈(((a+bc(1+r(1-k)))/(2a+bc(1+r(1-k)))),(2/3)], (12) is negative, hence 
the optimal price is minimum, p=c. By contrast if α≤((a+bc(1+r(1-k)))/(2a+bc(1+r(1-k)))), 
then the F.O.C. gives 
 
                              p=((a+bc(1+r(1-k))-(2a+bc(1+r(1-k)))α)/(b(2-3α)))          (19) 
 
In this interval both the S.O.C. ((∂²)/(∂p²))=-b(2-3α)<0⇔α<(2/3) is verified. We have 
((a+bc(1+r(1-k))-(2a+bc(1+r(1-k)))α)/(b(2-3α)))≥c(1+r(1-k))⇔(1/2)≥α. 
 
Moreover, (1/2)<((a+bc(1+r(1-k)))/(2a+bc(1+r(1-k)))). Finally, if α>(2/3) the F.O.C. rewrites 
gives 
                           p=(((2a+bc(1+r(1-k)))α-(a+bc(1+r(1-k))))/(b(3α-2)))          (20) 
 
where (((2a+bc(1+r(1-k)))α-(a+bc(1+r(1-k))))/(b(3α-2)))>(a/b) and the S.O.C. is not 
verified. We can correctly state that (20) is a minimum point higher than the upper bound 
(a/b) on p. It follows that (12) is negative in α>(2/3), for which interval the optimal price is 
minimum, p=c. These findings are summed up by (13). 
 
 
A.2 Optimal leverage (17) 
Note that 
 
((∂k∗)/(∂α))=-(M/(c(1-α)√(4Mbr(2-3α)(1-α)+(1-α)²(a-bc(1+r))²)))<0 
for α∈[0,(1/2)), while ((∂k∗)/(∂α))=0 for α∈[(1/2),1]. It follows that L∗ is minimum for α=0 and 
equal to 
1-((√(c²(a-bc(1+r))²+8bc²rM)-c(a-bc(1+r)))/(2bc²r)). 
 
Such a value is strictly higher than 0 if and only if M<((c(a-bc))/2), in which case L∗>0 for any 
α. On the contrary, L∗ is maximum for α≥(1/2) and equal to 
 
1-((√(c²(a-bc(1+r))²+4bc²rM)-(c(a-bc(1+r))))/(2bc²r)). 
 
Such a value is strictly lower than 0 if and only if M>c(a-bc), in which case L∗=0 for any α. 
Finally, we solve by α the following inequality to compute optimal leverage of a firm with cash 
holding M∈[((c(a-bc))/2),c(a-bc)]: 
((√((1-α)(4rbM(2-3α)+(a-bc(1+r))²(1-α))))/(2bcr(1-α)))-((a-bc(1+r))/(2bcr))≥1 
 
and get α≤((2M-c(a-bc))/(3M-c(a-bc))), where M∈[((c(a-bc))/2),c(a-bc)] implies that ((2M-
c(a-bc))/(3M-c(a-bc)))∈[0,(1/2)]. 
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